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ON FRENCH INTERVENTIONS IN THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Georges A. Cavalier* 
INTRODUCTION 
ne of the main challenges in drafting this paper was compiling 
materials on “a moving target.” Nobody knows yet if the crisis is 
over, nor whether the actions implemented to cope with the crisis will be 
sufficient. France is still considering more interventions; for example, 
issuing an exceptional government bond. 
There is no “single” European answer to the crisis, although all E.U. 
governments have agreed on a consensus.1 Despite the coordination of 
the plan by the Eurozone governments, each Member State has imple-
mented differing individual plans. Of course, there has been some inter-
vention from the E.U. Commission in respect to competition law, and, in 
particular, rules for State aid. It appears more and more clear that a dis-
cussion on structural reform will happen on the E.U. level.2 
This paper first analyzes where France stands today in the global pic-
ture, and then underlines how French interventions are trying to hold this 
crisis in check. Finally, it makes a few predictions for reform. 
I. WHERE DOES FRANCE STAND IN THE GLOBAL PICTURE? 
Where does France stand in the global picture? The causes of the crisis 
are mentioned first, followed by a discussion of the impact of the crisis 
on the French economy as compared to other economies. 
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 1. See Press Release, Summit of the Euro Area Countries: Declaration of a Concer-
ted Action Plan of the Euro Area Countries (Oct. 12, 2008); see also C. Chatignoux, Les 
Leaders du G20 Sous Pression pour Apporter une Réponse Commune à la Crise, LES 
ECHOS, Apr. 2, 2009, at 6. 
 2. Alain Banluet, Sarkozy et Merkel Font Front Commun Avant le G20, LE FIGARO, 
Sept. 1, 2009. 
O
786 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:3 
A. Causes of the Crisis 
It is unnecessary to repeat in great detail the causes of the crisis, but it 
can be linked to three factors.3 First, global imbalance due to worldwide 
excess liquidity. This results from a major trade surplus and large public 
savings in emerging countries like China.4 A second cause is microeco-
nomic failure. Usually, when stocks are high, yield-to-maturity rates for 
bonds are low. In order to maintain profitability, banks have had to in-
crease the volume of their activity by easing lending conditions and by 
using securitization vehicles.5 The use of securitization is a third cause. It 
consists of transforming traditionally illiquid bank loans into securities 
traded on the market through an ad hoc legal entity.6 What is the impact 
of this crisis on the French economy? 
B. Impacts in France 
Last May, the cover page of “The Economist,” the liberal English 
magazine, led readers to think that it was going to say mea culpa.7 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy was on the top podium smiling down 
on a somewhat depressed German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and, the 
poor English Prime Minister Gordon Brown stood buried in gloom and 
doom. 
                                                                                                             
 3. See John Cassidy, Anatomy of a Meltdown, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 1, 2008, at 
49; PATRICK ARTUS, ET AL., COUNSEIL D’ANALYSE ÉCONOMIQUE, LA CRISE DES 
SUBPRIMES 11–60 (2008), available at http://www.cae.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/078.pdf; see also 
BANQUE DE FRANCE, LA CRISE FINANCIERE 9–10 (Feb. 2009), available at 
http://www.banque-france.fr/fr/publications/telechar/doc_debat/numero_2/integral.pdf. 
 4. Indeed, the productivity stock impacted growth, which in turn boosted earnings 
forecasts and led to an increase in investment and, therefore, lending. Under normal cir-
cumstances, an increase in inflation limits increase in lending, which in turn prompts a 
rise in interest rates. In the case of the subprime crisis, there was excess liquidity world-
wide, which prevented inflation; global inflation continued to fall, and any volatility va-
nished. The drop in inflation led to a drop in long-term rates, fueling an abundant and 
bargain credit supply. 
 5. When markets were down, investors turned to bonds. Because of the macroeco-
nomic imbalances, yield-to-maturity rates were very low. To keep up with profitability, 
banks increased the volume of their activity by easing lending conditions. That should 
have led to an increase in banks’ equity to preserve the debt/equity ratio, but banks pre-
ferred to avoid this constraint by using securitization vehicles. 
 6. For example, the bank that issued the loans sold them to a special purpose vehicle 
that financed the acquisitions by issuing shares on the markets. The investors then pur-
chased the shares that payed the revenue linked to the loans (interest and repayment of 
the principal). Securitization allows banks to transfer their credit risk to the market. In 
theory it is good to spread the risk. The problem is that a bank that no longer bears risks 
often becomes less strict in screening and monitoring. 
 7. A New Pecking Order, THE ECONOMIST, May 9, 2009, at 13. 
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The highly regulated French economic model appears to be weathering 
the crisis better than the old liberal English model. President Sarkozy 
recently outlined his vision of a “Brave New World,” in which France 
would lead the way with the most rigorous regulations on record.8 
Based on this observation, is laissez-faire an obsolete system? Just be-
cause France has resisted the crisis better than other countries does not 
mean that it will resist forever. Nothing is free in this world; there will 
certainly be a price to pay for greater social security and job protection. 
France may be slow to adjust and less innovative, leading, in the long 
run, to sluggish growth. 
Looking at the litigation side, although people filed complaints in 
France because of the crisis, they are not equivalent in either number or 
subject matter to those filed in U.S. courts. The explanation for this is the 
attractiveness of U.S. securities class actions and the possibility of juris-
diction in U.S. courts over class actions initiated by French investors 
against French corporations.9 
Nevertheless, France was severely impacted by the crisis, and the 
French government has reacted. Let us examine these interventions. 
II. STATED INTERVENTIONS IN FRANCE 
The French State first intervened directly through the French Bank Re-
lief Act.10 The second set of interventions was more structural and indi-
rect, such as reforming executive compensation rules. These types of 
interventions will be discussed. A number of ad hoc measures such as 
                                                                                                             
 8. French Regulatory Vision, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2009, at 1. 
 9. See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Securities Litigation, 2009 WL 855799, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also Pierre Servan-Schreiber & Olivier Boulon, Le Contentieux 
Boursier né de la Crise Financière en France et aux Etats-Unis, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE 
DE DROIT FINANCIER 7 (2009). But see Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 
5257 (June 24, 2010). 
 10. See Didier Martin, Olivier Saba, & Forrest Alogna, European Responses to the 
Financial Crisis, JCP/LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE (2009); see also MAYER BROWN LLP, 
SUMMARY OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS IN FINANCIAL MARKETS – FRANCE (2009), 
available at  http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=7847&nid=6; see 
also PASCAL BINES & SIDNE KOENIGSBERG, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM 
LLP, 2009 INSIGHTS: NAVIGATING TUMULTUOUS TIMES 26 (2009), available at 
http://www.skadden.com/content/sitefiles/Skadden_0D39513A6E12353AA89BFD6B8452
7ADF.pdf; ROBERT PAROLAI ET AL., CLIFFORD CHANCE LLP, FRENCH ACTION PLAN TO 
RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN THE BANKING SYSTEM (2008); LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, 
EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS ACT TO STABILIZE MARKETS (2008); Symposium, Aspects 
Juridiques de la Crise Financière, JCP E (2009); Symposium, L’actualité du Droit Finan-
cier sur Fond de Crise, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT FINANCIER (2009). 
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parts of the French rescue plan, for instance Dexia,11 or the French auto-
mobile manufacturers Renault and Peugeot-Citroën, will not be dis-
cussed.12 
A. French Bank Relief Act 
The most direct intervention to rein in the crisis is the French Bank Re-
lief Act (“the Act”) adopted October 15, 2008.13 The main features of the 
Act are the creation of two special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”): a Refi-
nancing Company14 and a Recapitalization Company.15 The Act estab-
lishes a State guarantee for any debt securities issued by these two com-
panies. In other words, State aid to banks consists of guarantees granted 
to these two companies, and is not granted directly to the banks for their 
own underwriting. 
This is a major difference between France and the U.S. In France, the 
Act provides financing through the Refinancing Company, which can 
raise money partly due to the confidence inspired by a State guarantee. 
On the contrary, the U.S. plan provides credit to the bank itself to obtain 
financing. One advantage of the French SPV is that it allows banks to 
raise funds at rates lower than those available to private institutions that 
qualify for a State guarantee.16 The French plan is easy because a single 
vehicle issues bonds. 
Therefore, the French Bank Relief Act enables the State to become a 
major player in rescue efforts.17 Thus, the State has become both a “lend-
er of last resort” and a “buyer of last resort.” 
                                                                                                             
 11. This refers to the action plan to save Dexia Group so it could continue to finance 
local French authority. Other French initiatives include the battle against tax havens and 
the prohibition of short selling. See PAROLAI ET AL., supra note 10. 
 12. Matthew Saltmarsh, France Announces $8.5 Billion Plan to Help Struggling Auto 
Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2009, at B3. 
 13. Law No. 2008-1061 of Oct. 16, 2008, French Bank Relief Act, Journal Officiel de 
la Republique Francais [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Oct. 17, 2008, p. 1; see also 
Opinion of the European Central Bank CON/2008/56 (Oct. 21, 2008). This paper limits 
itself to discussion of the financial industry. It does not discuss other direct interventions, 
such as aid to households to limit the increase in payment defaults, or the Strategic In-
vestment Fund to support the development of small and medium-size businesses and 
increase protection for the capital of strategic companies. 
 14. Société française de refinancement de l’économie or SFRE. 
 15. Société de prise de participation de l’Etat or SPPE. 
 16. VIOLAINE LE GALL, L’AGEFI, LA SFEF BOUCLE UNE DEUXIÈME EMISSION DE SIX 
MILLIARDS D’EUROS À DEUX ANS (Dec. 2, 2008). 
 17. See MAYER BROWN LLP, supra note 10, at 2–3; see also BINES & KOENIGSBERG, 
supra note 10, at 26; PAROLAI supra note 10; LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, supra note 10. 
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1. State as a Lender of Last Resort 
The French State has agreed to play the role of a lender of last resort in 
order to maintain liquidity and to support inter-bank financing. The state 
accomplishes this via State/governmental guarantees, and through the 
Refinancing Company. The State guarantees the Refinancing Company’s 
obligations. The Refinancing Company then loans out funds it raises to 
institutions. The consideration provided for the loan is the posting of col-
lateral interest at a mark-up rate, in addition to the rates required by the 
international credit market. 
France allows a broad category of financial institutions to take advan-
tage of the State guarantee, whereas the U.S. restricts eligibility to banks 
and related institutions.18 An “opt out” is possible in the U.S., whereas in 
France the scheme allows the financial institution to decide whether 
loans or bonds are preferred. By providing an opt-in/opt-out scheme, 
both the American and French plans preserve a quasi-contractual charac-
teristic. 
On October 24, 2008, seven French banks requested loans from the 
Refinancing Company for a total of 5 billion euros. The Refinancing 
Company borrowed funds from the financial institution of the French 
Government, the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignation. Thereafter, the Re-
financing Company issued several public bonds, the proceeds of which 
were used to advance loans to credit institutions. It is estimated that the 
Refinancing Company will issue bonds totaling 80 billion euros in 2009, 
out of the total budget of 265 billion euros. 
2. State as a Buyer of Last Resort 
The second component of the French Bank Relief Act is recapitaliza-
tion. For a total of 40 billion euros, recapitalization provides financial 
institutions with a sufficient cushion to continue to finance the “real” 
economy. The level of banks’ regulatory capital directly affects the num-
ber of loans allowed. Through this recapitalization scheme, banks’ 
debt/equity ratio should increase by an average of 1%. 
It is the second SPV, the Recapitalization Company, which houses two 
types of instruments issued by the banks: deeply subordinated notes19 
                                                                                                             
 18. See WILLIAM D. TORCHIANA, UNE REPONSE A LA CRISE FINANCIERE : L’ACCES DES 
SOCIETES ETRANGERES AUX PLANS DE SOUTIEN ETATIQUES, JCP (2009). 
 19. In French: titres super subordonnés. A deeply subordinated note, which is also 
known as a “Perpetual” or “Perp,” is a bond with no maturity date. Therefore, it may be 
treated as equity rather than debt. 
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and preferred shares.20 In the U.S., investments made under the new Cap-
ital Assistance Program21 are placed in a trust.22 Although France has 
recently adopted a trust-like structure—the fiducie—it is, in fact, the Re-
capitalization Company that receives investments. In December 2008, 
the Recapitalization Company had already distributed the first tranche of 
10.5 billion euros to six French banks. Technically, all these banks issued 
deeply subordinated instruments – not preferred shares. The Recapitali-
zation Company subscribed to these deeply subordinated instruments. 
During the summer of 2009, the Recapitalization Company distributed 
a second recapitalization tranche to BNP Paribas and Société Générale 
in the form of preferred shares, rather than deeply subordinated notes.23 
No voting rights attached to these preferred shares because the aim was 
to inject capital, not to gain control. BNP Paribas issued 5.1 billion euros 
of preferred shares, enabling it to repay the 2.55 billion euros of deeply 
subordinated notes subscribed by the Recapitalization Company. 
There are at least two mechanisms that drive credit institutions back to 
private investors. The first is the very high interest rate of about 8.2 % 
charged by the Recapitalization Company for deeply subordinated 
notes.24 The dividend for the preferred shares is even higher. The second 
mechanism that encourages prompt repayment is that the principal must 
be paid back at a premium that increases over time. For instance, the 
principal amount which has to be paid back would be over 10 % if one is 
waiting more than six years to repay his or her loan.25 All of these are 
direct interventions by the French State, but there are other less direct 
and more structural interventions that aim to better regulate the financial 
industry. 
                                                                                                             
 20. Both the deeply subordinated notes and the preferred shares are qualified as Tier 1 
capital (France’s regulatory cap on the proportion of Tier 1 capital that may be 
represented by hybrid instruments has been raised from 25% to 35%). However, their 
regulatory treatment is not identical: whereas only 35% of the Tier 1 capital may include 
deeply subordinated notes, preferred shares are eligible for up to 50%. See The Next 
Wave Should be Shares, INT’L FIN. L. REV. (2009). 
 21. See Minimization of Long-Term Costs and Maximization of Benefits for Taxpay-
ers, 12 U.S.C.A. §5223 (2008). To greatly simplify, money is given in exchange for pre-
ferred stock that pays a 9% dividend. 
 22. For this component of the plan, other European States also created an SPV (e.g., 
Germany and the U.K.). 
 23. This was due to the different regulatory treatment of preferred shares and deeply 
subordinated notes. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 24. This was to ensure that the initial capital injection of 10.5 billion euro would gen-
erate 850 million euro by the end of 2009. 
 25. A call may be exercised by banks at par during the first year, at 101% during the 
second year, and the premium reaches 111% after the sixth year. 
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B. Structural Interventions 
Structural interventions are at the national level, though more and more 
often they are adopted at the E.U. level.26 Three pieces of French legisla-
tion will be mentioned: first, the law modernizing the securitization legal 
framework; second, the law enhancing hedge funds competitiveness; and 
third, a stricter regulation of executive compensation. They are presented 
below in chronological order. 
1. Securitization 
Securitization is one cause of the crisis. However, “it is not because the 
water is not clean that you have to throw out the bathtub too . . . ” This is 
why it is not surprising that France has decided to modernize the legal 
framework of mutual debt funds, to make securitization more attractive.27 
In the past, mutual debt funds were not attractive because their lack of 
legal and tax personality was an issue when transferring foreign recei-
vables. One of the major features of the June 2008 ordinance is a new 
category of securitization vehicles with legal personality that allow secu-
ritization of insurance risk and extend the asset class of receivables that 
can be securitized.28 
2. Hedge Funds 
Some authors describe hedge funds as an accelerator of the crisis.29 
Here, the general view in France is not to eliminate hedge funds, but to 
regulate them better.30 French law has therefore introduced gate possibil-
ities as well as side pocketing for hedge funds in an ordinance dated Oc-
tober 23, 2008. The idea is to cope with the liquidity crisis on a micro-
economic level. 
                                                                                                             
 26. See infra Part IV. 
 27. Philip Boys, New Legal Framework for Securitization, INT’L LAW OFFICES, (Sept. 
9, 2008), available at 
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/detail.aspx?g=a9415593-42c6-4286-
bea3-eb2d592c6a0c. 
 28. It now includes the assignment of future receivables arising under lease agree-
ments and lease purchase agreements. 
 29. Claire Gatinois, Pétrole: Les Fonds Spéculatifs Attisent la Flambée des Cours, LE 
MONDE (Nov. 23, 2007); see also J. Attali, Le Vortex du Monde, L’EXPRESS (Dec. 29, 
2007), http://blogs.lexpress.fr/attali/2007/12/le-vortex-du-monde.php; M. Rocard, La 
Crise Mondiale est Pour Demain, LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR (Dec. 13, 2007), 
http://hebdo.nouvelobs.com/sommaire/les-debats/075556/la-crise-mondiale-est-pour-
demain.html. 
 30. See generally Georges Cavalier, La Réglementation des Fonds Spéculatifs (The 
Regulation of Hedge Funds, and State Funds), REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE 
DROIT COMPARÉ (2010). 
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As a reminder, mutual fund shares (including hedge funds) are re-
deemable from investors at any time; whenever an investor wants to exit 
the fund, it is possible. A gate provision restricts the amount of with-
drawals an investor can make from the fund. It aims to insure the liquidi-
ty of hedge funds. Gates allow management companies to cap the 
amount of capital withdrawn from a fund at each scheduled redemption 
date. In other words, gates control the liquidity of the fund by spreading 
redemptions over time. It keeps the fund from having to sell off assets at 
fire-sale prices, which is disadvantageous to investors. 
One can find a similar concept in side pocketing. This type of account 
separates illiquid assets from other liquid investments. The October 2008 
ordinance also made this possible. 
3. Executive Compensation 
Executive compensation is probably the hottest topic in France today. 
Corporate governance is increasingly capturing attention. An Act passed 
in 2007 increased scrutiny of “golden parachutes” by prohibiting the 
award of deferred compensation to resigning corporate officers in listed 
companies, unless the compensation was conditional on the achievement 
of performance objectives.31 It is a way to ensure that “golden para-
chutes” are not a “reward for failure.” 
In the same vein, on October 6, 2008, the French Business Confedera-
tion32 presented a new Code of Corporate Governance (the “Code”) 
which proposed stricter regulations.33 It focuses on several objectives, 
including: (i) putting an end to “golden parachutes” and “golden hellos,” 
and (ii) creating new rules for granting stock options and preferential 
shares. 
In the context of the crisis, it is now required that the beneficiaries of 
the French Bank Relief Act comply with the new Code, but the Code is 
“soft law” and hardly sufficient. Therefore, responding to public outcry, 
the French government issued a Decree in March 2009 banning stock 
options and limiting bonuses for bankers who lay off workers after ac-
                                                                                                             
 31. See AMF REPORT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CONTROL, AUTORITE DES 
MARCHES FINANCIERS (Jan 28, 2008); see also Lukasz Stankiewicz, Tax Reform in 
France: Sarkozy’s Tax Package of August 2007, BULLETIN FOR INTERNATIONAL 
TAXATION (2008). 
 32. The Mouvement des Entreprises de France (MEDEF) is the leading network of 
business people in France. 
 33. See Catherine Malecki, Régulation Financière: Les Codes D’entreprise Feront-ils 
Grise Mine?, RECUEIL DALLOZ (2009). 
2010] FRENCH INTERVENTIONS IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 793 
cepting government aid.34 A number of French executives, including se-
nior management at Société Générale, have recently abandoned bonuses. 
III. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 
Even for the French, it is hard to make predictions in our “Brave New 
World.” Prophecy has always been harder than history; however, hereaf-
ter is a guess about what will happen next. 
One may predict that a strong international voice will be part of any 
lasting solution. This is already true for credit rating agencies, with ef-
forts at the E.U. level to regulate them.35 For instance, the ratings metho-
dology now has to be public. This might also become true for executive 
compensation, where the European Commission has made recommenda-
tions on remuneration policy in the financial services sector. Even more 
recently, President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel, pledged their wil-
lingness to fight unjustified remuneration for traders.36 Prime Minister 
Brown joined that pledge a few days later, followed by confirmation 
from the G20 Finance Ministers. Solutions cannot be made unilaterally 
because the market for traders is international, and institutions are com-
peting for a limited pool of profitable talent. 
Additionally, one may predict that pragmatism and efficiency will 
guide solutions in the current competitive environment. After all, is it so 
difficult to accept that there is not just one model of economic develop-
ment, and that models evolve over time? The liberal model is probably 
best for the United States. However, if one tries this system in France, 
the result may be a new French Revolution. The French population is not 
likely to accept large income disparities with low social output. Moreo-
ver, even after the crisis is over, applying the French system in the Unit-
ed States will likely provoke another Boston Tea Party.37 
Every nation and economy has to find a niche that best fits its talents 
and culture. It is not always easy to compare apples to oranges. Pragmat-
ism and efficiency do not always aligned to one single ideology. Howev-
                                                                                                             
 34. Decree No. 2009-348 of March 30, 2009, Journal Officiel de la Republique Fran-
caise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France] (as modified by decree dated Apr. 23, 2009). 
 35. The E.U. approved a regulation of credit rating agencies; the same movement can 
be observed in Japan and Australia. 
 36. Norma Cohen, Jean Eaglesham & Brooke Masters, Europe’s Leaders Call for 
“Binding Rules” to Rein in Bankers’ Bonuses, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2009, at 1. 
 37. See generally Zachary Roth, Tea Party Group: Obama is Both Goebbles and 
Mengele, TPMMUCKRAKER, (Sept. 4, 2009), available at 
http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/09/tea_party_group_obama_is_both_
goebbels_and_mengele.php. 
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er, pragmatism and efficiency will always be a cornerstone of an effec-
tive market. 
Lastly, a new role should be assigned to lawyers in the financial and 
commercial arena.38 Law is not economy. Historically, lawyers were 
priests. Legal systems are moral systems, they are like religions and can 
be all-powerful – as well as have their own heretics! Some institutions 
gave money away for free. Everybody thought the château on the hill 
was worth 100, but it was a fairy tale; it was worth only 50. With laws, 
lawyers may be able to ground human optimism and dispel the belief that 
you can get rich quick doing nothing! 
                                                                                                             
 38. See Philip R. Wood, Predictions for the Future of Financial Law and Lawyers, 9 
BUS. L. INT’L 234 (2008); see also Yann Paclot, Crise Financière, Crise du Droit, LA 
TRIBUNE, Jan. 14, 2009, at 8. 
